T o assess whether there has been a reorientation in American politics, we must examine two areas: the election results themselves and die current state oi the debate around certain crucial areas of public policy. The latter now covers a wide range ol issues, including the Constitution itself, welfare, Social Security and economic policy. Hanging over the debate is die question whether the Republicans can translate Ameri cans' apparent disaffection from Washington into positive actions to reduce the power of the federal government and to return significant decisions to die states and to indi viduals. This task may prove to be extraordinarily difficult: very many Americans are now locked into various government schemes, especially Social Security ar.d Medi care, and will be very reluctant to abandon them whatever contemptuous duigs they may say about government to pollsters.
What Happened in November 1994?
The meaning of die election result itself should not be misunderstood. It was not an earthquake, a landslide or even a sweeping victory. The Republicans securec only 51 per cent of the votes cast for House of Representatives seats, die narrowest winning margin since 1984; and their Senate majority (54 to 46) was helped by two post election defections by Democrats. More intriguing is the fact diat die she of die Democrats' defeat in the House (diey are now in a minority of 199 to 235) was partly dieir own doing. They are now under-represented in die House as measured by die popular vote. By some estimates (Polsby & Popper, 1995) diey direw away up to 15 seats by an inept piece of gerrymandering. This came about as a result of a perverse use of die Voting Rights Act 1965 (as amended and interpreted from 1982). The original legislation was designed to ensure equal access for blacks and odier minorities to die vote. But it was perverted from diis aim by civil rights activists: a nunber of congressional districts were redrawn so as to guarantee the election of blaccs. The result was diat majorities were uselessly piled up in some districts, leaviig fewer Democrat voters for more closely contested seats elsewhere. This was most risible in die Soudi but it apparently also contributed to die defeat of a Democratic stalwart, Dan Rostenkowski, in Chicago. It has also signilicandy increased die power if blacks in die Democratic Party: dieir share of Democratic seats has risen from 15 ptr cent to 19 per cent. Since diey tend to be radical, Clinton will find it more difficult tc shift die Democratic Party in a moderate direction. Aldiough diere are now increasng num bers of black conservatives in America, black Democrats seem not to have changed very much since die 1960s.
Many commentators are disturbed by diis further example of die 'Balkaiisation' of American political life. It had been exemplified with die nomination by Clinton of Lani Guilder -an advocate of representation by race -to an important evil rights executive position. The resulting controversy compelled die President to vididraw her name. Indeed, Clarence Thomas, die controversial black appointment t) die Su preme Court, made his only serious contribution to jurisprudence so far wdi a bril liant attack on racial gerrymandering in Shaw v Reno (1993) . The Couit, having regularly upheld such action, has now said diat really bizarre redrawing of txundaries might be unconstitutional. Some Republicans are silent on die issue, for pu ely tacti-cal reasons, while remaining openly hostile to other cases of affirmative action and social engineering by race.
But perhaps the most significant long-term effect of the election is the change in tlie political geography of die Soudi. Once die basdon of die Democradc Party, for historical reasons only, it now has, for die first dme since Reconstrucdon, a majority of Republican representadves. As die Wall Street Journal put it die day after die elecdon: ' The Civil W ar is finally over in the Soudi'. Most Soudiem conservadve Demo crats have now defected (an early example is Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, now a leading Republican contender for die presidency) or openly support Republican nadonal policies. Ol course, Republican presidents have always relied on Soudiem Democrats in Congress to get dieir measures dirough; hut now die reladonship be tween die South and die Republican Party is much more open.
Even diougli die November 1994 result was a rebuff for die Democrats radier dian a rejection ol all politicians (after all, not one incumbent Republican was de feated), die Republicans could easily suffer electoral retribution if diey fail to deliver on dieir promises of reducing taxation and die burden of government. Aldiough die Contract widi America may have been cobbled togedier for electoral purposes, it is addressed to diose problems in American society diat arc of abiding significance. It is also pertinent to note diat House Republicans are much more radical dian dieir Sen ate counterparts: die latter took no part in die Contract and are likely to hold it up, even over die long period. It is die young House Republicans who represent die con servative mood diat is said to be sweeping die country.
But what exacdy are die diings diat bodier Americans? W hy is die richest coun try (and still, remarkably, among die most stable countries) in die world going through such a protracted period of self-examination? For even if die Congressional election results do not indicate a direct change of political opinion on die part of die electorate, it is undeniable dial die social and intellectual environment is more favourable to con servatism dian it has been at any time since die 1920s. The country is replete widi free-market diink tanks (diougli more donations are made to liberal ones), and some, including die Heritage Foundation and die Cato Institute, have close connections widi die Republican leadership. T he intellectual elite in America is no longer exclusively liberal, aldiough pro-government activists still have a stranglehold on die media and die universities (especially die more prestigious private ones -a nice irony).
It is not necessarily easy for non-Americans to grasp just how unfashionable con servative thinking was in America from die 1930s until die 1970s. At die political level die Republicans had adopted a 'me too' attitude towards die New Deal. They prom ised not to repeal it but to moderate its more overdy anti-market and anti-capitalist features. O f die congressional leadership, only Senator Robert Taft, who narrowly lost die presidential nomination to Dwight Eisenhower in 1952, stood for die old val ues ol small government, free markets and a reduced role for America in international affairs. Aldiough Eisenhower is normally diought, correcdy, to have been a conserva tive president, die old Republicans never regarded him as a true spokesman for dieir values. The humiliation ol Senator Barry Goldwater in his bid for die presidency in 1964 seemed to convince many conservatives diat fundamental reforms to die system were impossible. Indeed, the 'country club' Republicans, who remain powerful even after die November election, earned the scarcely disguised scorn of their younger and more ideologically committed colleagues.
New Directions in American Politics
Just what is it diat Americans, and not just overt conservatives, are re-examining? The short answer is diat it is Roosevelt's legacy of big government, extensive social welfare and crypto-Keynesian economics, as implemented by successive presidents: John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and now Bill Clinton. O f course, Roosevelt was subde enough not to press very hard on civil liberdes and die race issue; he did not want to offend his Soudiem partners in a superfi cially unlikely Democradc coalition. Reform here was pioneered by Johnson and others. There is now clearly a reaction against diis from which Democrats are almost certain to lose. Indeed, according to The N ew York Times (10 November 1994), white males, die main 'victims' of affirmative action programs designed to benefit blacks and women, are now overwhelmingly Republican.
As in all tilings American, we must go back to die Constitution to understand what is going on. Most critics of government maintain diat die document no longer protects die states or individuals against predatory action by die federal audiorities. There has, for example, been a complete reversal of die proportion of G D P spent by Washington compared widi dial spent by die states since die early part of diis century. No doubt diis was made possible by die passage of die Sixteendi Amendment (1913), which audiorised die raising of a federal graduated income tax. But it was also helped by a supine Supreme Court (post-1937), which has allowed die central government to occupy areas traditionally diought to be die responsibility of die states. T he Court has also refused to protect die rights to contract and property (see Siegan, 1980) while ex panding civil liberties to areas not specified in die Constitution. For example, what ever die moral rights and wrongs of abortion, many conservatives objected to Roe v Wade (1973) precisely because in it die Supreme Court invalidated 50 state statutes (some of which already allowed die practice) overnight In fact, diis decision simply carried on die tradition of removing most state audiority from die area of civil liberties, a process diat was begun by die W arren Court .
Many Americans dierefore feel diat diere has been a kind of nationalisation of economic, social and moral life diat would not have been permitted by die Founding Fadiers. Hence die demand for die resuscitation of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to die states and die people all powers which are not specitically allocated to die federal Congress. However, since die 1930s die Commerce Clause, which was originally intended to ensure free trade between die states, has been used to audiorise a vast expansion of central regulatory power. The nadir of die states' audiority was reached in 1985 when die Supreme Court, in Garcia v Sail Antonio Transit Authority, ruled diat federalism meant only diat die states had representation in Congress. In odier words, ultimately diey have little or no legislative autonomy in die constitutional sense.
But we are now witnessing attempts to revive the Tenth, not only from politicians in search of votes but also from plaintiffs seeking redress in the courts for what they think is an unwarranted use of federal audiority. Litigation already under way is chal lenging the post-1937 use of the Commerce Clause, and Garem may well be over turned. T hat part of the Republicans' program which envisages the return of welfare to the states has to be understood not just in terms of economics (there is really no evidence that the states will be any more parsimonious here than Washington) but as a response to a widespread feeling that the federal government has gone beyond its proper bounds.
The lact that spectacular depredations to the Constitution have regularly occurred throughout die 20th century has not diminished die Americans' faidi in dieir docu ment. That is why diey repeatedly try to do constitutionally what most countries do polidcally. T he demand for a balanced-budget amendment is an explicit recognidon ol die failure of die ordinary democradc process.
Intractable Problems for Conservative Policy-Makers
It seems to be widely recognised, even by Democrats, diat vote maximising in competidve party democracies does not lead to die promotion of die public good but to die emergence of coalitions of interests dial use die instrument of taxation to reward dieir clients. Hence die predominance of 'pork-barrel' politics in die US. In diis complex bargaining process, members of Congress reward dieir own areas widi fed eral largesse. The fact diat such expenditures are tacked on die end of bills, such as die Budget, diat have to be passed fuelled die demand for a line-item veto (which has now passed die House). The general point is diat die voters are in a massive 'prisoners' dilemma': in die long run diey all (or nearly all) lose from excessive federal spending, but none has any rational incentive to refrain from action diat promotes it. W hereas Democrats want to get round die dilemma by 're-inventing government' (whatever diat means), die Republicans prefer constitutionalism.
Intriguingly, at die November election a small number ol Republican candidates actually said diat they would not take 'pork' lor dieir districts and states even if diey had no guarantee diat odiers would be so public-spirited. However, in die absence of die opportunity to 'punish' defectors from such very informal agreements, it is impos sible even to imagine diat die dilemma could be overcome dirough voluntary co operation. But at least conservative politicians are aware of die potentially selfdestructive properties of conventional democratic politics. The Democrats are equally aware of die problem but, because of dieir power base in various interest groups, are less eager to do anydiing about it 1 he obvious examples here are Social Security and Medicare for die aged: bene fits diat people diink diey have paid for dirough lifetime contributions dirough die payroll tax. Actuarially diis is, of course, nonsense, but such is die power of mydi diat no politician dare openly question diese payments. W hen diis kind of bogus morality is combined widi die fear of electoral retribution (and the elderly, unsurprisingly, have a higher voting turnout dian die young), diere is almost an insurmountable obstacle to reform. T he Republicans have repeatedly said diey will not touch Social Security, rather in die way diat Conservative politicians in Britain always claim Üiat the National Healdi Service is sale in dieir hands.
The fundamental problem in American politics is diat die most cosdy of welfare programs are not regarded as 'welfare' by die Aanerican voter. Yet Social Security and Medicare clearly are such: diey are financed by a redistribudon from die young to die old. But what Americans diink of as welfare -food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, a program diat dates back to die 1930s), additional help to unmarried modiers and assistance to die uninsured poor -constitutes less dian 2 per cent of public spending. However, die projected spending for 1995 on Social Se curity and Medicare is over US$400 billion (out of a total budget of $1.5 trillion). It is clear, dierefore, diat no American government can make any serious dent in die gov ernment deficit (now running at $200 billion a year) by attacking die unpopular wel fare programs alone.
Social Security is wordi looking at in more detail since it is probably die most im portant long-term problem of American social policy (see Barry, 1985) . Inaugurated in 1935, it was originally meant to be self-financing: die tax receipts would consdtute a fund on which future redrees would draw. However, it very quickly became a 'pay as you go' scheme in which die present generadon of workers pays pensions to current redrees on the implicit understanding diat future cohorts of workers will be similarly generous to it. Such schemes are vulnerable to changes in die birth rate and to in creasing longevity dirough medical improvements. America has been experiencing bodi diese phenomena. Especially important is die decline in die birdi rate, which has reduced die support rado (die number of workers per redree) from about four to one in die 1950s to about diree to one now. It is expected to fall even furdicr as die babyboom generadon starts to redre from about 2015. Pessimisdc social sciendsts (Ferrara, 1980; Weaver, 1983; Craig Roberts, 1983) predict vast increases in payroll taxes to finance die government's unfunded legal obligadons (now put at over $8 tril lion).
It is true diat reforms were made in die Reagan years (see Barry, 1993) and trust funds were built up. But diese consist solely of government debt diat will one day have to be redeemed, leading to higher taxes. O f course, if diere had been exclusive private saving (in stocks and bonds) for old age, die capital structure would have been deepened, pardally solving die populadon problem. But, given die way American politics operates, it is difficult to see how die problem can be solved.
Exacdy die same potenfial fiscal nightmare exists widi Medicare (which is only partially financed by contributions). Enacted in 1965 as part of President Johnson's Great Society program, it similarly depends on die illusion dial die recipients have actually paid for dieir treatment Indeed, Clinton's completely misguided health care reforms were mistakenly aimed at controlling die growdi in private spending on healdi when, in fact, die major cost increase has occurred in Medicare and Medicaid (zeropriced treatment for die poor). These two programs togedier now account for nearly 40 per cent of total spending on healdi in die US. While it might be possible to make some economies in Medicaid -its cost is shared between die states and die federal government -die vote-maximising imperative is likely to preclude reforms to Social Security and Medicare until events compel governments to take action: by which time it is normally too late and one generation is bound to be h urt (Both the House and the Senate have now included Medicare cuts in their plans to balance the budget by 2002. But even if those cuts were eventually to be implemented, the overall cost of Medicare would continue to rise.)
The Moral Problem of Welfare W hat ordinary Americans seem to care about most -and it is a concern to which politicians naturally respond -is the social and behavioural problems that have be come associated with welfare of the conventional type (see Mead, 1992) . The appar ent breakdown o( the family, and the emergence of an underclass that shows every sign of reproducing itself through time, have animated the more moralistic conserva tives (represented by the Christian Right). The most pressing problem seems to be the collapse ol die black family. In certain inner-city areas 80 per cent of black babies are born out of wedlock; die overall average is 60 per cent All diis is associated widi die rise in crime and die emergence of a drug culture. There is evidence that die white community is beginning to show similar tendencies.
Aldiough Republicans and Democrats are in some agreement about die counterproducdve effects of easily available welfare, and bodi parties favour some form of workfare, die former are more committed to a complete overhaul of the system. The plan, which has passed die House, is to end federal programs such as food stamps and AFDC, hand over money to die states in die form of block grants, and permit diem to spend it almost as diey wish. This has been tried before (under President Nixon, for example), but widi litde success, largely because die states managed to transfer items of federal spending diat had been cut to areas diat had not. This dme, however, die refonn is more radical because, if implemented, it will abolish a whole swadie of f ederal programs.
1 he issue is perhaps one of morality since, as noted above, not much saving can be made from cuts in diese welfare programs. Its existence does, however, point up some potentially important fissures in die ideological structure of conservative Repub licanism. I here has always been a tension between its economic and moral tenden cies, which was illustrated quite beautifully when Christian Republicans objected to projected welfare cuts on die ground that diey would lead to an increase in abortions. 1 his difference in oudook is likely to pose problems for conservative Republicans in odier areas of public policy.
The Return of Supply-Side Economics
Republicans in Congress will hope to solve the budgetary problems by supply-side refonns as well as spending cuts. It is quite likely diat diey will fall into die Reagan trap of hoping diat lower tax rates will generate increased revenues and so obviate the need for really severe, and politically damaging, reductions in public services. As if diis were not serious enough, it is almost certain that diey will run up against presiden tial vetoes on tax cuts diat seem to advantage die rich. Most Republicans diink diat a capital-gains tax cut is justified on efficiency grounds because it would free capital, which is at present locked up in unproductive sources, for investment Various sug gestions have been made for achieving this end without the rich being presented with an 'unjustified' gain.
But although both political parties in America claim to be acting on behalf of the apparently forgotten middle classes in their proposed tax cuts, it is these groups that at present gain so much from bloated federal expenditures. Not only do Social Security and Medicare go mainly to the retired, many of whom who are already well off, but many other services, including college loans and other educational opportunities, farm subsidies and veterans' benefits, are not aimed exclusively, if at all, at the poor. Public choice theory tells us that nothing much will change here. Just as thieves rob banks because that is where the money is, politicians appeal to the middle classes because that is where die votes are.
There is, nevertheless, one supply-side area where real progress can be made widiout running into insurmountable difficulties posed by entrenched pressure groups: regulation. One of die legacies of 40 years of Democradc Congressional rule is an extremely cosdy set of rules covering clean air, clean water and die environment in general. Not only have compliance costs slowed industrial development, widi not much benefit to die environment (see Anderson & Leal, 1992) , but individuals have suffered great injustice when diey have purchased land that subsequendy became seri ously devalued, and occasionally almost wordiless, because of an environmental reguladon. Many lawyers (see Epstein, 1984) have argued diat die 'takings' clause of the Fifth Amendment, which forbids die taking of private property into public use widiout just compensation, ought to be enforced when property values are reduced by regula tion (as well as when it is paid for a straight taking through 'eminent domain').
Some progress has been detected in die case of Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992), in which a person who had bought a stretch of beach lor devel opment for US$1 m, only to have his investment wiped out by an environmental regulation, took his case all the way to die Supreme Court. He was eventually com pensated. However, it is agreed diat too much should not be read into this case since it was somewhat special: Mr Lucas lost all of his investment. In most cases the value of property is simply reduced and there would appear to be no redress in such cir cumstances.
The Republicans are apparendy not prepared to wait for legal developments but have proposed diat a congressional statute should enjoin public audiorities to com pensate landowners affected by a reguladon that only partially reduces die value of dieir property. Despite die comments of environmentalist critics, compensation will not be paid where die regulation is designed to prevent the property holder causing damage to die community.
Environmentalists are certain to object to any move diat protects industrialists against disabling legislation; but die power of such groups may be on the wane. Al ready a significant body of work (see Ray & Guzzo, 1993) is being built up that clearly, and scientifically, refutes dieir more apocalyptic prognostications. Furthermore, fed eralism may not quite be moribund, for die states are now beginning to compete widi one another (see Becker, 1995) in offering favourable conditions in order to attract investment. This is not just in die environment but in most other areas of industrial regulation and, of course, taxation. That is die way federalism should work. Throughout most of the 20di century die aim of American liberalism has been to cre ate uniform standards in virtually all areas of public policy, precisely in order to pre vent diis type of jurisdictional competition.
Concluding Thoughts
The political scene in America is at the moment unusually exciting. It is true that the mood of the country is determinedly anti-political. This is borne out by the fact that a significant number of states had already passed term limits for tiieir senators and rep resentatives in advance of similar moves by Republicans in Congress. (In the event, die attempt to do this by constitutional amendment failed its early stage; and the Su preme Court has struck down as unconstitutional the term limits imposed by the states.)
However, we must be careful how we interpret this distrust of politics. It does not extend to political activity that preserves the privileges of the elderly, favoured welfare recipients and beneficiaries of federal 'pork'. And it is in these areas that the perma nent problems lie: unsolved, and possibly incapable of solution given the structure of American politics. Americans may hate Congress but they still rely on dieir particular congressmen to bring home die bacon. Conservative Republicans have tended to prefer die luxury of cosdess moralising to die politically difficult and electorally unre warding task of implementing needed economic reforms. But it is by their perform ance in die latter diat diey will ultimately be judged.
